Abstract-The business potential of device-to-device (D2D) communication including public safety and vehicular communications will be realized only if direct communication between devices subscribed to different mobile operators (OPs) is supported. One possible way to implement inter-operator D2D communication may use the licensed spectrum of the OPs, i.e., OPs agree to share spectrum in a co-primary manner, and interoperator D2D communication is allocated over spectral resources contributed from both parties. In this paper, we consider a spectrum sharing scenario, where a number of OPs construct a spectrum pool dedicated to support inter-operator D2D communication. OPs negotiate in the form of a non-cooperative game about how much spectrum each OP contributes to the spectrum pool. OPs submit proposals to each other in parallel until a consensus is reached. When every OP has a concave utility function on the box-constrained region, we identify the conditions guaranteeing the existence of a unique equilibrium point. We show that the iterative algorithm based on the OP's best response might not converge to the equilibrium point due to myopically overreacting to the response of the other OPs, while the Jacobi-play strategy update algorithm can converge with an appropriate selection of update parameter. Using the Jacobi-play update algorithm, we illustrate that asymmetric OPs contribute an unequal amount of resources to the spectrum pool; however, all participating OPs may experience significant performance gains compared with the scheme without spectrum sharing.
not only share the radio network infrastructures but may also share the spectrum, i.e., active RAN sharing. In [13] , feasible scenarios of inter-operator radio resource sharing are illustrated, i.e., flexibly and dynamically allocating resources on-demand. Since OPs may have different demands, one requirement is to allocate a different amount of resource to different OPs, i.e., allocating a certain amount of resource for a specified period of time and/or cells on-demand, or guaranteeing/limiting a minimum/maximum spectrum allocation. However, [13] does not propose any algorithm to determine the amount of spectrum allocated to each OP and address the requirement on inter-operator spectrum sharing for D2D communication.
In parallel with the standardization effort, research is being undertaken to address the fundamental problems in supporting co-primary inter-operator spectrum sharing. In many studies, inter-operator spectrum sharing has been treated as a game where OPs participating in the game are players, each has an individual utility to maximize, can either cooperate or compete to deal with the strategic interactions of one another for a game-theoretic problem. A cooperative game approach is proposed in [14] [15] [16] where participating OPs can obtain the benefits, i.e., fair and efficient spectrum allocation, from exchanging operator-specific information, i.e., channel state [14] , utility function [15] , interference price [16] . However, OPs are essentially competitors, and may not want to reveal proprietary information to the competitors and other parties. Considering the selfishness of OPs, spectrum sharing based on a non-cooperative game approach is more appropriate to model and analyze strategic interactions in a co-primary manner.
A non-cooperative game approach has been studied for spectrum sharing between co-primary users [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In [17] , spectrum sharing among co-located RANs based on a oneshot game has been studied, but the equilibrium point under load asymmetry could be inefficient for some OPs who do not impose any operator-specific constraints on the decision space. In [18] , a distributed learning algorithm for spectrum sharing has been proposed to increase the convergence rate. The learning rate chosen by each user would result in different convergence rates among the users, thus stability is not ensured. In [19] and [20] , auction-based spectrum sharing is studied, where participating OPs competitively bid for spectrum access through a spectrum broker. In [21] , penalty-based utility functions for spectrum sharing are constructed. Adopting marketdriven or punishment-based sharing schemes, however, might not be realistic, because OPs may not be willing to change their revenue models. Above all, the algorithms [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] do not consider the heterogeneity in service type offered by OPs, i.e., mainly cellular link is considered.
There have been many studies on spectrum sharing for D2D communication, e.g., [22] among others, but only singleoperator D2D is taken into account. Spectrum allocation for inter-operator D2D based on a non-cooperative game model was first proposed in [7] . Provided that the game is concave and every OP satisfies the diagonal dominance solvability condition (DSC), there exists a unique NE (Nash Equilibrium) and the sequence of best responses converges to it from any initial point. However, the analysis and convergence of the best responses are valid only in a setting with two OPs. In this paper, we extend the study presented in [7] by considering CoPSS for inter-operator D2D communication with an arbitrary number of OPs. The main novelty and contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Inter-operator D2D communication over dedicated cellular spectral resources contributed from an arbitrary number of OPs, is proposed, while intra-operator D2D users subscribed to the same OP can use a dedicated resource or reuse the cellular resources of the OP.
• A general framework for a constraint-based utility maximization problem is proposed, where different preferences of different operators are encompassed. This can be extensively applied to utility and constraint designs under concavity and monotonicity.
• A non-cooperative game for co-primary interaction is established, where the OPs make offers about the amount of spectrum committed to the spectrum pool without revealing operator-specific information to other OPs, and the offers are exchanged by an iterative strategy update algorithm. We show that the Jacobi-play update, with a careful selection of update parameter, can converge to a unique equilibrium with an arbitrary number of OPs, enabling an OP to set the reliable but myopic strategy in a distributed manner.
• Using the proposed CoPSS solution, we show that all
OPs under different intra-operator loads can experience performance gains compared to the baseline scheme where the OPs do not share spectrum. The efficiency of the non-cooperative game solution is evaluated for different utility designs, weighted sum and weighted proportional fair. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the system model and problem formulation are presented. In Section III, the non-cooperative game is established with the utility and constraint designs, the existence of a NE, the introduction of the iterative algorithm to reach a NE, and the relation between the uniqueness and local stability properties of a NE. In section IV, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of the iterative algorithm are provided, and a distributed algorithm always converging to a unique NE is proposed. In Section V, we demonstrate the spectrum sharing gain. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we consider the system model and problem formulation used in [26] , applicable to increasing the co-primary spectrum usage opportunities for 5G mobile operators.
A. System Model
We consider N OPs enabling D2D communication. An OP may have two types of D2D users: firstly, intra-operator D2D (a.k.a. intra-D2D) users, i.e., the two ends in the D2D pair have subscriptions with the same OP; secondly, and inter-operator D2D (a.k.a. inter-D2D) users. A D2D pair can communicate in a D2D manner (a.k.a. D2D mode) or via the nearby serving BSs (a.k.a. cellular mode). D2D communication in unlicensed bands would suffer from unpredictable interference. Because of that, at this moment, licensed spectrum seems to be the way forward to enable D2D communication, especially considering safety-related scenarios such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication. In the licensed band, either dedicated spectrum can be allocated to the D2D users (a.k.a. D2D overlay) or D2D and cellular users can be allocated over the same resources (a.k.a. D2D underlay). An intra-D2D underlay has a higher spectrum reuse factor and it may result in high spectral efficiency with appropriate interference management. An intra-D2D overlay enjoys higher spectral efficiency than the case where D2D communication is not enabled, and less implementation complexity than the underlay case [22] . In an inter-D2D underlay, cellular users may suffer from interoperator interference, and in order to resolve it, information exchange between the OPs might be needed. Due to the fact that OPs may not be willing to reveal proprietary information, we believe that, at the first stage, the inter-D2D overlay scheme would be easier to implement [7] .
Each OP utilizes the total available spectrum divided into multiple sub-bands. Without loss of generality, we assume a fixed and equal bandwidth for sub-bands to easily determine the total available sub-bands. The number of available subbands are equally allocated among all users for fairness of resource usage, or may be based on a set QoS per user. We assume a fair share of resources among users. In particular, in CoPSS, whether or not an OP may contribute an equal amount of spectrum to the shared band, the performance accessible to inter-D2D users in D2D mode should be proportional to the bandwidth allocated to the spectrum pool under the fairness rule [26] . In inter-D2D and intra-D2D modes, each user accesses a sub-band with a certain medium access probability. In cellular mode, the resource allocation is controlled by the BS which schedules the users in a roundrobin manner, and thus the corresponding spectrum resource is shared equally. Accordingly, the average numbers of users over sub-bands allocated for each transmission mode are the same. Fig. 1 shows the spectrum allocation for the OPs in case they employ the overlay principle for inter-D2D communication, while intra-D2D communication can be either in overlay or underlay. A fraction β cd i of the i -th OP's spectrum is dedicated for cellular and intra-D2D communications. The fraction β cd i is further divided into two sub-fractions in an intra-D2D overlay scheme,
where β c i and β d i are fractions of the i -th OP's spectrum, dedicated for cellular and intra-D2D communications, respectively. No matter which scheme is used for intra-D2D communication, an OP contributes a fraction β i of spectrum to the spectrum pool, β = i β i , where inter-D2D communication takes place. An inter-D2D pair can use any of the resources contributed to the pool. Obviously, β cd i + β i = 1, ∀i . While in our analysis we assume FDD OPs that contribute frequency resources for D2D communication, the same analysis is applicable to TDD OPs that contribute time-frequency resource blocks with time synchronization among the OPs.
The mode selection decides whether a D2D pair should be communicating in D2D or in cellular mode. The mode selection algorithm is not necessarily the same for different OPs neither for inter-D2D and intra-D2D communications. Mode selection determines the density of D2D transmissions, thus the potentials for increasing the frequency reuse factor. At the same time, it affects the amount of interference among the intra-D2D users and the cellular users in a D2D underlay, and the amount of the D2D self-interference in a D2D overlay. As a result, mode selection and spectrum allocation for D2D communication are coupled in the system design. For instance, in dense deployments, a mode selection resulting in high inter-D2D density and thus in high self-interference in D2D can be compensated by allocating more spectrum for inter-D2D communication. This means there would be less spectrum available for cellular and intra-D2D transmissions in an inter-D2D overlay.
In literature, mode selection for single-operator D2D utilizes either D2D pair distance [23] and/or the distance between the D2D transmitter and cellular BS [27] , or energy-based detection threshold [28] as selection criterion. In a setting with multiple OPs, implementation of mode selection is not straightforward: Participating OPs need to agree about the mode selection criteria in the spectrum pool. Also, they need to decide which OP should be responsible for taking the decision and communicating it to the users. In this paper, we investigate the spectrum allocation problem, while the mode selection is not treated in detail. Instead, we model the impact of mode selection through the fraction of intra-D2D users selecting D2D mode, denoted by δ i , and the fraction of inter-D2D users selecting D2D mode, denoted by q. The parameters, δ i and q, are related. For instance, when the value of q increases, more inter-D2D users would select D2D mode, or equivalently less inter-D2D users would communicate over cellular resources. This would affect the parameter settings, e.g., δ i and β i , which determine the performance accessible to cellular and intra-D2D users. This model can be extended to incorporate the impact of more general mode selection algorithms on the performance gain for a future study.
B. Problem Formulation
Each OP must experience performance gain from enabling inter-D2D communication. Such a gain can be quantified by excess utility showing the difference between the OP's utility, U i , when spectrum sharing is used, i.e., β i > 0, and the utility, U min i , when spectrum sharing is not used, i.e., β i = 0. When the utility of an OP with spectrum sharing is lower than the utility with no sharing, U i < U min i , the spectrum would not be shared. Inter-operator D2D support poses a requirement for exchanging signaling information between the OPs. Because of that, when spectrum sharing takes place, we assume that an OP contributes at least a small positive fraction of spectrum, β min i > 0, i.e, β i ≥ β min i , for the signaling channel. OPs agree a priori to use a common decision threshold for selecting the inter-D2D mode. This threshold can be mapped to a fraction of inter-D2D users communicating over D2D, q. OPs are free to optimize the fraction of intra-D2D users communicating over D2D, δ i . Hence, the value of δ i is not necessarily equal to the corresponding fraction without spectrum sharing.
The utility of an OP, U i , may depend on the amount of spectrum all OPs contribute to the spectrum pool, β, while the utility, U min i , does not. Given the aggregate proposal from the opponents, β −i = j =i β j , each OP identifies its contribution, β i , and intra-D2D mode selection parameter, δ i , for maximizing the utility, U i , under operator-specific constraints. These constraints can, for instance, refer to the rates of cellular users and intra-D2D users in D2D mode. The constraint functions for cellular users and intra-D2D users in D2D mode could be larger than target values, respectively, h , and the constraint functions for no spectrum sharing can be evaluated in advance. We assume that feasible target values are selected so that these constraints without spectrum sharing, i.e., β = 0 and q = 0, are satisfied. To sum up, the amount of spectrum to be contributed for inter-D2D communication, β i , and the fraction of the intra-D2D users in D2D mode, δ i , could be identified as follows Maximize :
We assume that the utility function, U i , in (1a) is concave in β i for a fixed δ i . The concavity of the utility with respect to β i indicates that the marginal utility decreases with a further increase in β i ; Diminishing marginal utility means that the more an OP contributes spectrum to the spectrum pool, the less utility gain is obtained. Once the maximum of U i is achieved, any further increase in β i may decrease U i . For instance, if U i incorporates both inter-D2D and cellular or intra-D2D user rates, allocating more spectrum in the spectrum pool could increase the rate of inter-D2D users in D2D mode, but at the same time less spectrum becomes available for cellular and intra-D2D transmissions. We assume that the constraint functions, h c i and h d i are concave in β i for a fixed δ i . These assumptions allow the one-dimensional constraint set of an OP to be convex, closed, and bounded. Thus, if there is always a β i such that the constraints in (1b) and (1c) are strictly satisfied, the first-order KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient.
In an intra-D2D underlay, we assume that constraint functions, h denote the amount of spectrum fraction for cellular and intra-D2D communications, satisfying the constraints (1b) and (1c). Due to the fact that the left-handsides (LHSs) of (1b) In an intra-D2D overlay, we assume that each OP has a utility function considering the D2D user rates so that the maximum of the utility occurs along the feasibility border of the spectrum allocation factor β c i with respect to δ i . Thus, for a fixed δ i , the constraint function for cellular users could be equal to a target value, h c i = τ c i , and the optimization property is the same as in the intra-D2D underlay case. Let , respectively, for a fixed δ i . While the problem in (1) is concave in β i , it is not known to be jointly concave in both β i and δ i . In case of the nonconvex problem in (1), finding an optimal solution may be intractable, since the first order conditions are necessary, but not always sufficient. Note that the optimal solution of the problem in (1) exhibits the intuitive monotonicity property. The use of the monotonicity property would substantially alleviate the difficulty in obtaining the optimal solution of the problem in (1), by allowing some solution to be on the boundary of the feasible set. For the monotonic solution, according to Topkis's theorem [29] , the constraint set needs to have an ascending or descending property. This property is satisfied if the boundaries of the constraint set are increasing or decreasing functions of a parameter. We assume that the upper limits of β i are increasing in δ i , determined by β is increasing in δ i and thus the constraint sets hold the ascending property [29] .
In an intra-D2D overlay, we assume that β c,min i and β
d,min i
are decreasing in δ i . The LHSs of (1b) and (1c) are increasing in δ i for a fixed value of β i , because more intra-D2D users in D2D mode yield more time resources available for cellular-based communication and more concurrent D2D transmissions, resulting in increasing rates of cellular users and intra-D2D users in D2D mode. Due to the increased interference, D2D link rate might decrease but the increasing fraction of intra-D2D users in D2D mode dominates the rate in D2D mode, which will be justified later. 
in an intra-D2D underlay and β
in an intra-D2D overlay, are increasing function of δ i , holding the ascending property.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODEL
We consider a strategic non-cooperative spectrum sharing game among N OPs, G = (N , S, U), where N is the set of OPs, S = S 1 × · · · × S N is the set of the joint strategies, and
is the vector of utilities. The strategy space for an OP represents the spectrum fraction contributed to the spectrum pool, i.e., S i = {β i :
A. Design of Operator Specific Utility and Constraints
Each user calculates it's utility with the information of the performance locally measured or obtained via feedback channel from the receiver, and then sends it to the BS. With the utility information of all users, each OP can calculate the average utility and then broadcast it to all users for their intra-D2D mode selection decision which determines the density of active D2D users in the intra-D2D mode, δ i and spectrum allocation factor, β i . OPs may have different preferences concerning the spectrum allocation formulated by means of a utility function. Considering the different types of users, a utility in (1a) can be expressed as
where Q k i is the (normalized) average rate of the k-th type users, k ∈ {c, d, s}, and c, d and s correspond to cellular, intra-D2D and inter-D2D users. u i (·) can take different forms, e.g., weighted sum rate function:
where w k i ≥ 0 are weights indicating the normalized densities of the k-th type users.
The average rate, Q k i , refers to the ability of the k-th type users to achieve a certain level of data rate performance, which is generally assessed by scaling their average spectral efficiency, R In a real system, the average rate can be computed based on the measurements which can be captured by distributions. In this paper, we analyze the average rates for different communication modes by using a stochastic geometry approach [23] . Such a stochastic geometry-based performance can serve as the basis for game theory analysis [30] .
The coverage probability for a typical user in the m-th type mode in the presence of Rayleigh fading is computed as in [23] The interference level also depends on the density of interferers computed only after specifying the mode selection scheme. We assume that the locations of BSs, cellular, intra-D2D and inter-D2D users follow independent Poisson point processes (PPPs) with densities, λ b i , λ c i , λ d i and λ, respectively. And the mode selections in intra-D2D and inter-D2D modes just thin the PPPs with δ i and q. Then, L I cc and L I cd can be expressed as in [23] 
, ∀i , or a one-dimensional strategy domain with a fixed internal state,
is a fraction of intra-D2D users in D2D mode used for no spectrum sharing. While the utility is concave in β i , it is not jointly in β i and δ i . Due to the ascending property of the strategy space, the solutions of the problem (1) will be partly on the boundary of the feasible set,
. No matter which intra-D2D mode selection policy is used, i.e., the optimal value of δ i , δ i → δ max i , or its fixed value, δ i → δ o i , the selected parameter, δ i determines the one-dimensional box constraint, and the amount of its coupled spectrum fraction is proposed for the spectrum pool. The solution, β i , of the optimization problem (1) maximizes the individual utility, but may not be a NE in a non-cooperative spectrum sharing game, G. Next, we study the properties and solutions of the game.
B. Existence of NE and Iterative Dynamics
In G, the NE is an important concept since it represents a steady state where the utilities of all OPs are maximized. A strategy profile vector
One of the most important questions is whether a NE exists or not.
Proposition 3 [32] : The game G admits at least one NE, since S i is a non-empty, compact, 1 
and convex set of Euclidean space, and each utility is continuous and concave on S i .
Once proven that a NE always exists, the problem of how to reach such an equilibrium arises. In order to reach the NE, an iterative distributed strategy update algorithm can be used. If strategies at t − 1-th iteration are β (t −1) , the iterative strategy scheme leads to the strategies for t-th iteration, described as
is an iterative response process which is a vector valued mapping
The most common updating orders for β based on the mapping M are the parallel update and the sequential update. We prove the convergence for parallel update mapping where all components are updated simultaneously, i.e., β
Due to the lack of space we omit the sequential update case. 1 Strategy space is compact if it is closed and bounded.
In this paper, we consider an iterative algorithm, the Jacobi-play (JP) strategy update. The mapping function implemented by the JP dynamic is given as
is the best response to the aggregate proposal from the opponents, β
], and κ (t ) i
> 0 is called a smoothing parameter 2 representing the willingness of i -th OP at t-th iteration to maximize its own utility. The Best-reply (BR) strategy is a special case of the JP strategy choosing κ (t ) i = 1. The difference between the two algorithms is in whether or not to have κ (t ) i = 1, ∀t, which enables the OPs to behave in a myopic manner, strictly or flexibly.
A mapping function satisfying some convergent condition would converge to a NE. This is guaranteed if M(·) is contraction mapping [35] , ρ T (t ) < 1 where ρ (·) is the spectral radius and
However, when the value of ρ(T (t ) ) is used as the convergence criterion, a central entity is needed for collecting the coefficients of T (t ) from all OPs. This undesirable case in G can be replaced by a sufficient condition.
Lemma 1 [36]: If each OP satisfies that the sum of the row line of the matrix T (t ) is less than one, T (t )
) is a contracting iteration. If every OP satisfies the condition everywhere individually, and thus the NE obtained as a result of such an iterative play is globally stable, then the iterative response process converges to the unique NE, and thus no matter where the game starts the final outcome will be the same, the global stability of the equilibrium candidate points implies uniqueness. However, this is restrictive, because the contraction mapping may be only satisfied with partial strategy space implying local stability. Thus, the obtained NE might not be unique. In case there are multiple NEs, the selected equilibrium would depend on the initial strategy profile [35] . This might be undesirable because the performance of an OP would depend on the initial proposals of other OPs.
C. Uniqueness of NE
The non-trivial condition for the uniqueness of a NE in G can be relaxed by showing that a locally stable NE is unique [35] . We check whether a locally stable NE obtained as a result of such an iterative play is unique by the Poincaré-Hopf (PH) Index [37] , [38] requiring a certain sign from the Hessian, H , but this requirement needs to hold only at a NE, β . The obtained sign can be used to define the index for a NE, I nd(β ) = sign(det (−H (β )) ). We present some results on the structure of the NE set, providing conditions for the NEs to be locally unique, finite and globally unique.
Let K be the set of NE points. We first claim that K , is finite. Consider a NE β ∈ K where K is bounded due to the upper limit of the constraint set and closed due to the continuity of response mapping function, thus compact. The NE is locally unique if it is a strict local maximum of the utility function. If every NE is locally unique, it is locally isolated. Thus, there exists an open neighborhood such that there are no other NEs in the open set. The union of these open sets forms a cover for the set K ⊂ S. Since K is compact, it can be covered by a finite number of sets each containing a NE. Hence, the number of the locally stable NEs, |K |, is finite. Also, due to the fact that the strategy space is non-empty and convex, the sum of the indices for NEs is equal to one, β ∈K I nd(β ) = 1 [37] . A locally stable NE, β , is formed by the local maximum of each utility function. A strict local maximum can be ensured by a second order condition [39] which requires that i) the NE satisfies the complementary condition, ∇U i (β ) = 0, ∀i and ii) the Hessian at complementary NE is negative definite, det (−H (β )) > 0 where β ∈ K . From the second order conditions, the PH index theorem restricts the critical point to be in the interior,
In G, it is difficult to rule out the boundary NE where at least one of the OPs selects the strategy profile on the boundary of the strategy space. The restriction can be resolved by a generalized version of the PH index [37] which requires complementary and non-degeneracy assumptions. A NE is called non-degenerate if ∇U is continuously differentiable at β and H (β )|Ń is non-singular whereŃ = {i ∈ N |β min i < β i < β max i (δ i )} denotes the set of OPs selecting interior profile, and H |Ń denotes the principal sub-matrix of H corresponding to the indices inŃ . Thus, the non-degeneracy assumption boils down to the complementary condition for the sub-matrices of H .
In G, it is still non-trivial to evaluate the sign of the submatrix of the Hessian at a non-degenerate point. When an OP chooses the lower limit, β i = β min i , or upper limit,
, of his own strategy, other OPs are not able to notice the boundary profile. Thus, it is difficult to obtain the sub-matrix structure, H (β )|Ń , and check the non-singularity of the sub-matrix. In [38] , a stronger non-degeneracy condition is introduced to replace the complementarity condition with P-matrix property where the determinants of the arbitrary principal sub-matrices are positive.
When −H (β ) is a P-matrix and ∇U is continuously differentiable at β ∈ K , we say that β is a P-critical point. The critical point is not necessarily complementary, if the P-matrix property holds. Every P-critical point is nondegenerate. This fact allows accounting critical points on the boundary for their contribution to the index sum. 
D. Connection Between Uniqueness and Local Stability of NE
The following proposition shows that the Hessian matrix can be expressed in terms of the jacobian matrix, T from the implicit function theorem [36] . This would allow us to verify the condition for the row diagonal dominant matrix property (Lemma 2) with the sufficient condition for the local contraction (Lemma 1).
Proposition 4: Hessian matrix, H (β ) can be expressed in terms of the jacobian matrix, T , as H
Proof: The proof is in Appendix D. The following lemma shows that the row diagonally dominant property of the matrix −H (β ) is equivalent to the condition that the matrix norm induced by the infinity norm is less than one at the NE point β , T ∞ < 1.
Lemma 3: A NE, β , has a positive one index, I nd(β ) = 1, if U i is concave in β i and T ∞ < 1.
Proof: The proof is in Appendix E.
Remark 2: If every NE is locally stable (Lemma 3), K has an exact point, its uniqueness (Remark 1). Remark 3: Local stability of NE is equivalent to its uniqueness (Remark 2), but the opposite is not necessarily true.
Recall that to prove that the sub-matrix −H (β ) is a P-matrix, the determinants of arbitrary principal sub-matrices −H 
Remark 4: Local instability of NE could occur, even though there is a unique NE.
Proof: If the minimum and maximum eigenvalues ofT are less than a negative one and a positive one, respectively, min (ξ i ) < −1 and max (ξ i ) < 1, ∀i , for
then according to Remark 3, the game G has a unique NE. However, due to a negative dominant eigenvalue less than −1, it has ρ(T ) > 1. This implies that there is a unique but unstable NE, thus divergence of M(·).
Due to the fact that the spectral radius of a matrix is bounded by its matrix norm and the infinity norm property, we have ρ(T ) ≤ T ∞ ≤ T ∞ . The Remarks 3 and 4 motivate us to identify a proper contraction mapping resulting in T ∞ < 1 for convergence to a unique NE.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF JACOBI-PLAY DYNAMIC
In this section, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of JP dynamic to a unique NE, and propose a distributed algorithm where each OP checks the conditions independently and makes an offer about the amount of spectrum committed to the spectrum pool. Then the offers are exchanged and so forth till consensus is reached. While making the offer, each OP considers only its individual reward based on the opponents' proposals, and does not reveal any operator-specific information to the opponents.
A. Sufficient Condition for Convergence
To analyze the convergence of the JP dynamic in (2), we consider the jacobian matrix T (t ) = J (t ) of the self-mapping function in (2) and the elements of the jacobian matrix 
< 1, then the BR converges to the unique NE. A sufficient condition for the BR update function to exhibit a contraction mapping is to show that the maximum absolute row sum matrix norms is less than one,
Lemma 1). When ρ(J B R(t ) ) > 1, then the BR would diverge. However, if the maximum eigenvalue for J B R(t ) is less than a positive one, there is a unique NE as discussed after Remark 3. When κ (t )
If ρ(J (t ) ) < 1 for t ≥ 0, the JP converges to the unique NE. Otherwise, it would diverge, but the stability can be ensured by selecting a proper κ (t ) i , ∀i , at each t as we will show later. The presence of the diagonal terms will make the stability conditions in general different.
Remark 5: If the matrix J B R(t ) has the dominant eigenvalue less than −1 and the other eigenvalues less than 1, then according to Remark 4, there is a unique but unstable NE for the BR dynamic. The instability of the BR dynamic can be compensated by κ (t )
i < 1, ∀i.
Proposition 5: When the BR dynamic converges to the unique NE, j =i |J B R(t ) i j
| < 1, ∀i , the JP also converges with is not known to other OPs and it is non-trivial to find the exact eigenvalues of J (t ) .
The eigenvalues of a matrix can be estimated by using Gerschgorin's circle theorem [40] which provides bounds on the eigenvalues. Every eigenvalue of the matrix J (t ) lies within the union of discs, ξ ⊆ i=1 ρ i , where ξ denotes the eigenvalues of J (t ) and ρ i is a Gerschgorin's circle with center J
(t )
ii and radius
i j |}. If every disk is inside the unit circle, every eigenvalue lies in the union of the disk and thus ρ(J (t ) ) < 1. Since the diagonal element in each row of the matrix J (t ) is real, the center of each circle lies on the x-axis. The eigenvalues are bounded such that − j =i |J
ii , ∀i . If the lower and upper limits of the circle region are larger than a negative one and less than a positive one, respectively, −1 < −κ Proof: The proof is in Appendix G.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence
Next, we find the necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to a unique NE in G. For this, we show that all eigenvalues in absolute value are less than one. This condition is satisfied if the dominant eigenvalue is negative, larger than a negative one. According to [44, Th. 2] , the jacobian matrix, J (t ) , has exactly one negative eigenvalue with every other eigenvalue having no larger modulus, if all principal minors are negative. However, finding the condition on all negative principal minors of J (t ) is also difficult in G.
This non-trivial work can be resolved by recalling that in spectrum pooling the utility, U i , is impacted by additive combinations of the spectrum fractions other OPs contribute to the pool, β = i β i . Due to the linearity, the offdiagonal elements at row i in the jacobian matrix, J i j , j = i , are identical, equivalently the slopes of each OP's response function with respect to each opponent are identical. Intuitively, the use of κ
within the range (0, κ (t ) i,max ) is helpful in enabling convergence since it prevents the overreacting response to the proposals from the opponents. Fig. 2 shows an example indicating that even if there is a unique fixed point, the BR dynamic does not converge to the desired point, but the JP dynamic can converge with a suitable smoothing parameter κ (t ) i . Since each OP behaves in a myopic manner, it would select the maximum available parameter. Since κ 
C. Proposed Distributed Algorithm
In G, neither the utility functions nor the precise outcome levels of the utility functions of other opponents need be known to each OP. It is only necessary that each OP knows the behavior of the actual proposals the other OPs contribute to the spectrum pool. Given the BR update, if the contraction condition is satisfied, 3 i . 4 To sum up, we set κ i,max > 1. Thus, the consequence of the myopic manner might result in slow convergence rate. 4 Convergence speed depends on how close dominant eigenvalue is to 0 [40] ,
i.e., κ
Algorithm 1 Jacobi-Play Strategy Update
i ∈ S i , ∀i ∈ N 2: repeat 3: for i ∈ I do 4: end if 10 :
t ← t + 1 12: end for 13: until Convergence does not fulfill the sufficient condition would not participate in G, since its participation could cause the existence of multiple NEs which is undesirable in CoPSS. We assume that the iteration converges much faster than any change detected in the channel.
After the iterative distributed algorithms result in converged NE, it is natural to assume that the agreement will break if the utility of an OP is lower than the utility corresponding to no spectrum sharing. In [24] and [25] , distributed algorithms in non-cooperative resource allocation games were proposed to obtain a NE. However, the strategy update step size which similarly acts as κ (t ) i in this paper is a predetermined constant [24] or is determined by central entity [25] . Such algorithms are not applicable to CoPSS scenario, since they do not ensure the stability of NE in a distributed manner.
The converged NE is a point where one is likely to end up operating after the participating OPs compete with one another. However, even though the NE is unique, in general, it is not an pareto-optimal, or even a desirable solution from a social point of view. Thus, it is worth evaluating the efficiency of the converged NE, enabled by a comparison with the solution yielding a social welfare maximization, i.e., β * =
by the ratio of the sum of the utilities at the converged NE, β to the one at the pareto-optimal point, β * . The value of ψ indicates how the efficiency of the NE solution degrades due to the selfish behavior of OPs in G, i.e., ψ closer to 1 is socially better. In this paper, the socially optimal solution is obtained for the sake of comparison and study of NE efficiency.
OPs may disagree to operate at the social optimal solution, if each utility at β * is lower than the one at β , i.e., they want to cooperate but nevertheless act with self-interest. In this case, a cooperative solution based on the Nash product [45] can be computed, i.e., arg max β∈S i∈N (U i − U i,d ) where U i,d is the disagreement. The converged NE can play a treat point in such a cooperative game, since it represents the outcome in the event the OPs would realize their threat not to cooperate. With this disagreement, we may restrict the search space for cooperative solutions to the sub-region consisting of all points of S, making the search space smaller than the case when
where U i,o is the utility without Fig. 3(a) shows the concavity of the utilities with respect to β i , proven in Prop. 1, and the monotonic property of the constraint set with respect to δ i , proven in Prop. 2. As the optimal intra-mode selection, we have δ i → δ max i at each iteration, due to Prop 2. Thus, from Props. 1, 2, every OP has a concave utility on the box-constrained region, β min i
B. Convergence
). From Prop. 6, the uniqueness of NE is guaranteed if every OP meets −1 < J B R i j < 0, ∀i . Proposition 9: The uniqueness of NE is guaranteed, if every OP has a concave utility w.r.t β i .
Proof: The proof is in Appendix L. Proposition 10 [7] : The BR converges to the unique NE for N = 2, if the DSC, is set to be less than or equal toκ
Proof: The proof is in Appendix M. Fig. 3(b) shows an example on the convergence of JP dynamic to a unique NE for symmetric OPs. For robust convergence, each OP independently selects a proper relaxedκ = 0.22 which is in the contraction region. Then, the strategy profiles will be set in a similar way for the next iteration and so forth. In the end, the JP dynamic converges to the unique NE, β i = 0.12. Fig. 3(c) shows a divergence of the BR for the same parameter setting as in Fig. 3(b) . The BR is not a contraction due to J 
C. Performance
We evaluate the performance of the OPs for different intra-D2D densities for OP 1, λ d 1 , while we fix λ d 2 and λ d 3 to be equal to the cellular user density. We depict the spectrum fractions contributed by the OPs in Fig. 4(a) , and assess the sum rate gain for the OPs as compared to the case without inter-D2D support in Fig. 4(b) . The gain is computed as follows:
where Q In general, asymmetric OPs would contribute unequal amounts of spectrum. All OPs experience performance gain. One can see that symmetric OPs achieve around 145% gain.
For densities λ d 1 < 5, OP 1 who has less network load contributes the higher fraction of spectrum to the spectrum pool, see Fig. 4(a) , since it has enough capacity to satisfy its own constraints. Hence, the opponents enjoy more benefit from CoPSS than OP 1 does, see Fig. 4(b) . The inter-D2D user rate is larger than intra-D2D user rate, Q s i > Q d i , since the total amount of spectrum committed to the shared band is larger than the one allocated to intra-D2D users in D2D mode, β > β d i . However, due to the decreasing fraction of One can see that OPs using the underlay principle would contribute more spectrum for inter-D2D communications, and experience less performance gain, under the same constraint target values with the intra-D2D overlay approach. While cellular and intra-D2D users suffer from the mutual interference and less average spectral efficiency, the underlay scheme appears to achieve higher rates for cellular and intra-D2D users due to wider spectrum allocation. This enables an OP to have enough capacity satisfying its own constraints. Thus, an OP contributes more spectrum and achieves less gain compared to the no spectrum sharing case where a higher rate is already obtained in underlay compared to the overlay scenario. Fig. 4(c) shows the efficiency of the non-cooperative solution, the ratio of the utility sum at the NE point obtained by Algorithm 1 compared to the utility sum at the paretooptimal point, ψ. A socially optimal solution can be viewed as one type of fair allocation. The weighted P.F utility function allocates resource more fairly between two groups, e.g., intraoperator users and inter-operator users. An OP with this utility, who might be able to increase its own utility by allocating spectrum to the intra-D2D users or to the inter-D2D users, tends to avoid choosing an extreme value in his own strategy space for preference maximization. Such a rational manner in P.F utility function brings more fairness among OPs, and thus yields a result closer to the optimal one. The obtained NE efficiency can be used as a lower bound for a two-operator non-cooperative spectrum sharing game, since increasing the number of OPs leads to the NE efficiency compromise.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied spectrum allocation for D2D communication considering different mobile network OPs. We modeled the interactions between OPs as a non-cooperative game. We showed that the formulated game has a unique NE if every OP has a concave utility on the box-constrained region and all eigenvalues of derivatives of iterative response process are less than unity. Uniqueness can be identified in a distributed manner. The non-cooperative algorithm based on the OP's best response might not converge to the NE due to myopically overreacting to the responses of the other OPs. To resolve this instability, we proposed a JP strategy update algorithm with a proper smoothing parameter. Using the JP update we were able to study the system and draw useful remarks. Asymmetric OPs contribute an unequal amount of spectrum for D2D support. An OP may contribute a small amount of spectrum, but still the opponents may have the incentive to contribute more due to the D2D proximity gain. We illustrated that participating OPs may experience significant performance gains depending on the operator-specific network load, utility and design constraints.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Proposition 1
For intra-D2D overlay in the weighted sum rate utility, we show 
In a similar manner, we have (β cd i R d i ) < 0. In the P.F rate utility, By using the Leibniz rule [31] , and 
dr for the intra-D2D underlay, and C 2 = 0 for the intra-D2D overlay. Note that the probability a BS is active, α i [28] , decreases in δ i , since less D2D users select in cellular mode. Thus α i is negative and C 2 is non-positive. Inequality ( p4) holds true due to 1 − δC 1 − δC 2 ≥ 1 − δC 1 for both intra-D2D underlay and overlay. Inequality ( p5) holds true due to C 1 < γ c 1 
Note that the portion of time a user in cellular mode is active in the uplink, ν c i [28] , increases in δ i , and ν c i is positive, since less D2D users select in cellular mode. Thus, we show
)dr < 0 due to α i < 0. Thus, the inequality above holds with C 4 = 0 for the intra-D2D overlay. However, for the intra-D2D underlay, the inequality above does not hold yet due to
Instead, as discussed in Section II, we identify τ 
, the constraint set has ascending property.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
We consider the row diagonally dominant matrix where the diagonal element in each row of −H (β ) exceeds the sum of the moduli of the off-diagonal element. Then, in each row of −H (β ),
is row diagonally dominant with positive diagonal elements, arbitrary principal sub-matrices, −H (β )|N for anyN ⊆Ń are positive row diagonally dominant, and have positive determinants [40] . That is, −H (β ) is P-matrix, and β always has a positive one index, I nd(β ) = sign(det (−H (β ) )) = 1, no matter whether β is interior or boundary NE.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
The mapping function M is typically defined implicitly through the first-order conditions. 5 The first order conditions ∀i, ∂U i (M i , β −i )/∂β i = 0 hold for all β −i [36, p. 25] . For j = i we differentiate the first order condition for i with respect to β j , then
The Hessian matrix is defined as 
E. Proof of Lemma 3
The condition for the contraction mapping,
is row diagonally dominant with positive diagonal elements ensured by the concavity of the utility, β has a positive one index (Lemma 2).
F. Proof of Proposition 5
According to Lemma 1, the condition based on the infinity norm is sufficiently satisfied if each absolute row sum of the jacobian matrix based on Jacobi update is less than one, j |J
G. Proof of Lemma 4
The conditions for the lower and upper limits of the Gerschgorin's circle region to be in absolute value less than one can be expressed in terms of κ
observe that the condition for the upper limit is κ
| < 1, while the condition for the lower
. Since the maximum eigenvalue is less than one, instability of J (t ) can only be caused by the minimum eigenvalue. If the minimum eigenvalue is less than −1, the BR is not stable (Remark 4). Satisfying the condition for the lower limit of the circle region, κ 
I. Proof of Proposition 6
Following the proof of Lemma 5, all of the eigenvalues in J B R are less than one, if J i = J B R i j < 0 and d N = J ii − J i = −J B R i j < 1, ∀i , implying that there is a unique NE since the maximum eigenvalue is less than a positive one (Remark 4).
J. Proof of Proposition 7
According to Lemma 
L. Proof of Proposition 9
According to equation (3), the sufficient condition in Prop. 6 can be expressed as −1 < J B R i j = −∂ 2 i j U i /∂ 2 ii U i < 0 where ∂ 2 xy U i = ∂ 2 U i /(∂β x ∂β y ). Due to the utility structure subject to the system framework in CoPSS scenario: in-band overlay spectrum allocation, i.e., β cd i + β i = 1, and a shared spectrum pool usage, i. 
M. Proof of Proposition 11
The upper bound, |J B R i j |, can be obtained by is obtained by the RHS of (p1) for |J B R i j |.
